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IN TIIE SlJPRfr!E CDURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
cJll'IOND E. FOGG, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 19004 
vs. 
WNDA F. FCCG, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMEJ.IT OF IllE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the property division portion of a divorce 
case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE W\IER COURT 
The appellant was awarded the home of the parties subject to a 
judgment in favor of the respondent in the sum of $10,543.90, with terms for 
payment of that amount. The personal property was divided between the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Londa Fogg (hereinafter referred to as respondent) does not entirely 
agree with the statement of facts in the appellant's brief. 
The "postmarital equity" in the home at the time of divorce was not 
'11,455.00. The appellant calculates that amount by the following fornula: 
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$44,890.00 Value at the time of the divorce 
-22!205.00 Value at the 
$22,685.00 
time of the marriage 
-11!230.00 
$11,455 .oo 
Mortgage balance at time of the divorce 
Determining the equity under that formula is totally erroneous. It 
treats the facts as if there was no mortgage before the marriage. Such is not 
true. In other words it charges all the mortgage obligation to postmarital 
equity when in fact there was a mortgage prior to the marriage. 1he equity in 
the home at the time of the divorce is as follows: 
$44,890.00 Value at the time of the divorce (Defendant's 
Exhibit l; Tr. 140, 167) 
-11 1230.00 M:lrtgage balance at the time of the divorce (Tr. 144) 
$33,660.00 
1he premarital equity is as follows: 
$22,205.00 Value at the time of the marriage (Defendant's 
Exhibit l; Tr. 142-143) 
-14,500.00 Mortgage balance at the time of the marriage (Tr. 143) 
$ 7 ,705.00 
So of the $33,660.00 of total equity, $25,955.00 of it was accumulated 
after the marriage. 
$33,660.00 
- 7!705.00 
$25,955.00 
1his is figured as follows: 
Total equity 
Premarital equity 
Postmarital equity 
The other misleading thing about the facts is in connection with the 
vacation plan. During the marriage the parties purchased a vacation plan for 
$2,800.00. (Tr. 162-163) The claim that the vacation plan is worth $5,200.00 is 
based on inadmissible evidence. At the trial the appellant introduced a letter 
from American International Vacation, Inc. to the appellant stating that the 
current value of the vacation plan was $5,200.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) It 
was never received into evidence (Tr. 19) nor could it have been received into 
evidence because it is inadmissable hearsay. (Rule 63 of the Rules of 
Evidence) At the trial the appellant admitted that the vacation plan could not 
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s<>lli for more than $2,300.00. (Tr. 164) So the statement that the vacation 
r '" J, worth $5,200.00 is not only hearsay but obviously sales talk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT I.JERE ACCURATE AND 
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Appellant complains because of a letter sent by respondent's counsel 
to appellant's counsel and the court stating that the postmarital equity in the 
home was $25,441.79. Not only is that fact true, (actually it is short by 
$513.21) but it is supported by the record. (Tr. 140-144) 
The appellant is the party that is misleading the court with 
inaccurate information concerning equity. The error in appellant's thinking is 
set forth in respondents Statement of Facts above. 
Appellant also complains that after the letter there was no further 
hearing as requested. The so called request for a hearing simply said as 
follows: 
"However, I think it would be beneficial to the court 
and counsel if we could meet some convenient to 
the court and review these matters for ten or fifteen 
minutes." (Tr. 84) 
There was at least one hearing after that letter in connection with the 
appellant's Motion to amend the Findings of Fact. (Tr. 104) 
POINT II 
THE DECREE IS FAIR TO BOTH PARTIES 
\.lhen the true facts concerning the postmarital equity are made known, 
it is apparent that a judgment in favor of the respondent in the amount of 
,$10,543.90 is more than fair to the appellant. At the time of the marriage the 
appellant contributed the home with an equity of $7,705.00 and the respondent 
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contributed $8 ,000.00 in cash. (Tr. 140) The $8 ,000 .OU in wsh was used tG 1 
remodelling the home. (Tr. 157,166) So both parties ITBde about the same 
contribution to the home at the time of the ITBrr1age. So perhaps the 
respondent should have received one half of the total equity rnther than what 
has been called postrrarital equity. 
The reason why the respondent only got the postmarital equity was 
because the appellant suppossedly ITBde a $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 contribution 
from his navy retirement into the house at the time of the remodeling. 
However, that was not a lump sum cash contribution like the respondent made and 
it was just the appellant's retirement checks which went into the joint 
savings account. M3.ny things were paid from the joint account, so the money 
cannot really be earmarked. Furthermore, since those checks were only $500.00 
or $600.00 a month, it would have taken about ten months to have accumulated 
$5,000.00 to $6,000.00. The remodeling took place over two months, so it 
cannot be certain that the appellant actually made a $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 
contribution. (Tr. 154,165,167-168) 
Even if the navy retirement contribution is considered to offset the 
$8,000.00 cash contribution of the respondent, there is still a postmarital 
equity of $25,955.00. An award to the respondent of $10,543.90 is not unfair 
to the appellant. See Lundgreen vs. Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 670 (Utah 1947) 
POINT III 
THE A!{)UNT OF TilE JUlXMENT IS TilE At-DUNT REQUESTED 
BY THE APPELLANT IN THE PRAYER OF HIS COMPLAINT 
The appellant filed his complaint for a divorce in the court below on 
September 15, 1981. Paragraph 2 of the prayer of the complaint says as 
follows: 
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"That plaintiff be granted the home of the parties with him 
to pcy defendant the sum of $10,000.00 for her equity in 
'i.3 id home." 
, I<• ippdlant should not be heard to complain of the divorce decree when it is 
what he prayed for in his complaint. 
follows: 
POINT IV 
THE COURT HAS WIDE DISCRETION IN THE 
TERMS OF THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides as 
'\/hen a decree of divorce is rrade, the court rray rrake such 
orders in relation to the children, property and parties, 
and the rraintainance of the parties and children as rray be 
equitable." 
The division of property is a rratter that rests largely within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Pinney v. Pinney, 245 P.329 (Utah 1926) A 
large discretion is vested in the trial court in rraking distribution of 
property. Stewart v. Stewart, 242 P.947 (Utah 1926) The rratter of disposing 
of the property and providing for the support of the divorced persons and their 
children rest in the sound legal discretion of the trial court, reviewable only 
for abuse of discretion. Bullen v.Bullen, 262 P.292 (Utah 1928) 
POINT V 
THE AWARDING OF INTEREST IS WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE COURT 
The Workman case cited by the appellant is not authority for 
concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the 
respondent interest on the judgment. That case is distinguishable. In that 
'.dSe the trial court divided the equity in the home equally between the parties 
and the husband was ordered to either pay the wife that one half amount if he 
elected to sell the home
1
regardless of its sale price, or to purchase the 
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wife's interest within six months at the appraised price. The husband was 3 tsn 
ordered to pay the wife 8% of her equity amount. On appeal the :Oupreme u,111 t 
Utah said that where the decree made an equal division of the val11e of the 
property, there was no reason to compel the husband to pay the wife one half ·it 
the appraised value if he sold the property to a third party. The court said 
that if the property is sold to a third party, the wife should receive one halt 
of the actual price, without interest. 
In the Workman case, if the husband elected to buy out his wife's 
share, then the interest obligation was still applicable. In the case at bar 
the only option the appellant has is to buy the respondent's share. Therefore, 
like the Workman case, interest could be charged. If respondent's share of the 
equity is paid out today it is of more value to her than if she gets the money 
later. For that reason it is a sound exercise of the trial court's discretion 
to add interest to the obligation. 
It should be pointed out that interest does not begin until July 5, 
1983. That gives the appellant a reasonable time within which to sell the 
home, borrow the money or do whatever was necessary to pay her her share. 
POU·ff VI 
TI-!E DECREE OF DIVORCE DOES NOT INFRINGE 
ON THE APPELLANT'S NAVY PENSION 
Even if the law does not allow the respondent any interest in the 
appellant's navy retirement, the respondent made no claim to the retirement am 
the divorce does not touch it. 
When the true facts concerning the equity in the hrnae are revealed, it 
is apparent that the divorce decree is an equitable division of the [Jroperty 
without taking into consideration or even affecting the appellant's navy 
re ti remen t. 
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CDNCLUSION 
The decree of the trial court should be affirmed for the reasons set 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAO<MAN, CIARK & MARSH 
o. 6Q,.)"'\./ 
vid B. Boyce 
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